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Abstract 
Voice over IP (VoIP) technology is being extensively and rapidly deployed. The flexibility and cost 
efficiency are the key factors luring enterprises to transition to VoIP. Some security problems may 
surface with the widespread deployment of VoIP. This article presents an overview of VoIP systems and 
its security issues. First, we briefly describe basic VoIP architecture and its fundamental differences 
compared to PSTN. Next, basic VoIP protocols used for signaling and media transport, as well as 
defense mechanisms are described. Finally, current and potential VoIP attacks along with the 
approaches that have been adopted to counter the attacks are discussed.  
1. Introduction 
VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) has fast emerged as a standard for voice communication using the 
Internet. As VoIP uses the existing IP network, it dramatically reduces cost of communication typically 
with traditional PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network). In addition, ease of deployment and 
reduced communication hardware make VoIP a compelling solution for voice communication on the 
Internet. Further, VoIP provides a flexibility of value-added and personalized services for defining 
customized solutions. As a result, most of the control which existed in PSTN’s central infrastructure has 
been transferred to the end devices by deploying the VoIP communication infrastructure. 
 With the advent of VoIP technology, an increasing number of telecommunication service 
providers have stated to integrate VoIP solutions into their systems and provide VoIP services to their 
 customer base. Equipment manufacturers and end users have greatly benefited from performance 
advancements, cost reduction, and feature support provided by the VoIP technology.  
VoIP is a technology for transmitting voice packets on the existing IP network. Unlike PSTN, an 
IP network is packet switched. In PSTN, when a phone call between two parties is initiated, there exists 
a physical circuit connecting the two parties. After the call is established, the parties communicate and 
the circuit is reserved until the parties finish the communication. In contrast, on an IP network, all 
communication is carried out using IP packets. When a calling party communicates with a called party, 
the analog signals are digitized, encoded, and packed into an IP packet at the transmitting end and 
converted back to analog signals at the receiving end. 
VoIP is adding a third dimension to voice communication with the PSTN and cellular networks 
being the other two. A call can be made to any PSTN phone and mobile phone anywhere in the world 
using VoIP. Although certain services can only function on computer or a special VoIP phone; others 
allow a caller to use a traditional phone with an adapter. VoIP promises to enable migration of the 
existing circuit-switched, public switching telecom network to a packet-switched network. With VoIP, 
widespread acceptance by telecommunication markets of all sizes, advanced features have started 
emerging. However, the convergence of the voice and data worlds introduces not just opportunities but 
also security risks. The much lower cost and greater flexibility are key factors luring enterprises to 
transition to VoIP. VoIP should not, however, be installed without careful consideration of the security 
problems it can introduce. 
Security issues in VoIP are unique and, in most cases, quit complex. This article aims to provide 
an overview of VoIP security issues including basic VoIP architecture, existing defense mechanisms, 
and current attacks, as well as an outlook on potential attacks such as SPIT and their possible solutions. 
 To facilitate the ensuing discussion, we briefly describe the basic VoIP network architecture. The 
VoIP infrastructure can be visualized as three layers; end user equipment, network components, and a 
gateway to the traditional phone network (see Fig. 1). We define each of these layers as follows. 
 
Fig. 1 VoIP network. 
1. End-user equipment: The end-user equipment provides an interface for users to communicate 
with other end users. Equipment could be “hard phones” with an interface similar to a conventional 
telephone or a “soft phone,” software that emulates a telephone. The security of such end-user 
components depends upon how they are installed. Mostly, this end-user equipment often deployed in 
campus networks, at home, or in hotels. Rarely, however, does the equipment have security features 
built-in, making them vulnerable to exploitable flaws. 
2. Network components: VoIP normally uses the existing IP network and thus inherits its 
vulnerabilities. Each network component has its own security concerns which have surfaced over the 
past few years (e.g. Goodin, 2008; Chou, 2007). Adding voice traffic to these components increases 
their list of vulnerabilities. The IP network components, including routers, switches, and firewalls, must 
also be VoIP-aware to provide security features specified to VoIP. 
3. VoIP gateways: Gateway plays an important role in integrating the IP network with the PSTN 
and thus, care should be taken to ensure that its security policies do not introduce vulnerabilities. The 
primary functions of a VoIP gateway include voice compression or depression, signaling control, call 
 routing, and packetization. VoIP gateways interface with external controllers such as SIP proxies, H434 
Gatekeepers, Media Gateway Controllers (MGC), network management systems, and billing systems. 
These interfaces can be a potential weakness because malicious attackers can exploit them to make free 
telephone calls. Any security framework must counter these attacks quickly and efficiently.  
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes basic signaling and transport 
protocols used in VoIP network. Section 3 presents defense mechanisms in signaling and transport, and 
key management. The current and future VoIP attacks and possible solutions are discussed in Section 4. 
Finally, this article is summarized and concluded in Section 5. 
2. VoIP Protocols 
In order to communicate on the phone, a call must be initiated. Placing a phone call in a traditional 
phone system involves dialing a sequence of digits, which are then processed by the telephone company 
to ring the called party and form a connection when the call is answered. With VoIP, the user enters the 
calling number, which can be either a number on a telephone keypad or the Universal Resource 
Indicator (URI), and after that a sequence of packet exchange will occur based on VoIP “signaling 
protocol”. Once the called party answers, voice signal is digitized and segmented into a stream of 
packets for transmitting based on “transport protocol”.   
2.1 Signaling Protocols 
Current VoIP systems use either a proprietary protocol, or one of two standards, H.323 and the Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP). Although SIP seems to be gaining in popularity, neither of these protocols has 
become dominant in the market yet, so it is essential to understand both protocols. 
2.1.1 H.323 
H.323 is a set of protocols recommended by the International Telecommunication Union – 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) and consists of family of protocols that are used for 
 call setup, call termination, registration, authentication, and other functions (International 
Telecommunication Union, 2000). H.323 is widely adopted in the enterprise environment because it is a 
binary protocol which can be easily integrated with PSTN. An H.323 network consists of several 
components including Gatekeeper, Gateway, Multipoint Control Unit (MCU), and Back End Service 
(BES).  
2.1.2 SIP 
The session Initiation Protocol (SIP) (Rosenberg, Schulzrinne, Camarillo, Johnson, Peterson, Sparks, 
Hardley, & Schooler, 2002) is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) specified protocol for 
creating, modifying, and terminating unicast or multicast sessions. SIP is a text-based protocol and can 
transfer different types of payload with different encodings. SIP supports both UDP and TCP as 
transports. The architecture of a SIP network is different from the H.323 structure. A SIP network is 
composed of Endpoints, Proxy servers, Location servers, and Registrar. 
2.2 Transport Protocols 
The majority of the VoIP deployments use RTP for actual media (e.g. voice or video) transport. The 
RTP is specified by IETF in RFC 3550 (Schulzrinne, Casner, & Jabobson, 2003) and RFC 3551 
(Schulzrinne, & Casner 2003). It is a simple protocol that runs on top of UDP and therefore has “best 
effort” delivery but does not assure delivery of the packets since real-time properties of the streams are 
more important than reliability of transport (i.e. having to repeat a speech is better than having a long 
delay in phone conversations). The quality and fault tolerance of the media stream is defined by the 
actual media codec where different error-correction algorithms can fix the problems created by packet 
loss. The compression rate and quality of the codec determine the bandwidth requirement. The Real-
time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP) is used together with RTP, but it is not required for RTP 
streams to work.  The RTCP is primary used for collecting data on the efficiency and quality of the 
 connection. The RTCP messages travel on the same route as RTP and report information such as 
latency, jitter, and packet loss. The RTCP messages are typically collected and responded by the media 
gateway. 
3. Defense Mechanisms 
The basic protocols used in VoIP have been described in the previous section. The focus of this section 
is on analyzing protection mechanisms associated with VoIP protocols along with their strengths and 
weaknesses.  
3.1 Signaling Defense Mechanisms 
This section describes protection mechanisms associated with signaling protocols including H.235, 
S/MIME, and IPSec.  
3.1.1 H.235 
The H.235 is a security framework that provides authentication, confidentiality, and integrity, along with 
interfacing with key exchange protocols to support distributed communications for H.323 based 
systems. Several messages, procedures, structures, and algorithms are recommended by H.235 for the 
security concerns of signaling, control, and media communications under H.323 architecture. A typical 
H.323 setup using H.235 takes approximately 300 to 400 ms depending on the implementation. 
 H.235 provides end-to-end security and supports multicast and unicast security, however it does 
not scale well for Internet communications and it also requires greater level of implementation 
complexity compared to SIP. 
3.1.2 S/MIME 
RFC 3851 (Ramsdell, 2004) defines the Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) which 
can provide end-to-end confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for application protocols such as 
 SMTP and SIP. An S/MIME message is based on MINE, which defines a set of mechanisms to encode 
and represent complex message formats such as multimedia contents (e.g. audio, video) and foreign 
characters (e.g. Chinese, Greek) within other protocols such as SMTP or SIP. In addition to MINE 
functionality, S/MINE incorporates Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) to maintain its security.  
 The S/MIME provides confidentiality for the data in SDP, integrity of information within the 
SDP portion of the SIP message, and authentication of sender. Although, S/MIME provides great 
flexibility and end-to-end confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, it requires more effort to 
implement due to its complexity and infrastructure requirements (e.g. PKI). 
3.1.3 IPSec 
Security architecture for the Internet Protocol (IPSec) (Kent & Atkinson, 1998) provides protection to 
applications that transport using UDP or TCP. Due to the extensive coverage of IPSec, this section only 
focuses on its impact on SIP.  
IPSec provides confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for signaling and media streams by 
creating secure tunnels between end points. With SIP, if a call is to established between two endpoints 
and a IPSec tunnel is created for each communication link (caller-and-caller’s proxy, caller’s proxy-and-
callee’s proxy, and callee’s proxy-and-callee), there will be three IPSec tunnels which will take about 20 
seconds of call setup time where media stream link (RTP) will take about 10 seconds for setup (Thermos 
& Takanen, 2008). If the IPSec associations have been established, there is almost no delay in routing 
signaling messages.  
Although, IPSec provides a secure channel that can support UDP, TCP, SIP, and RTP, its 
infrastructure requirement must be carefully considered for appropriate situations (e.g. an extremely 
secretly phone call may find IPSec a great option where 20 seconds of call setup time is necessary). 
 3.2 Transport Defense Mechanisms 
This section discusses protection mechanisms associated with transport protocols including SRTP, and 
SRTCP. 
3.2.1 SRTP 
The Secure Real Time Protocol (SRTP) is a profile for the RTP defined by RFC 3711 (Baugher, 
McGrew, Naslund, Carrara, & Norrman, 2004) to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication 
of the message payload of media streams (voice and video). SRTP provides protection for both RTP 
packets and RTCP messages. As discussed previously that RTCP is used primarily to provide QoS 
feedback to the endpoints of a session. RTCP messages are transferred separately from the RTP 
messages, thus both RTP and RTCP need to be protected during a multimedia session. By using a native 
key derivation algorithm (Menezes, Van Oorschot, & Vanstone, 1997), SRTP is able to minimize 
computation and resource consumption for generating cryptographic keys through an external key 
management mechanism. 
 Although SRTP can provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for media content, it 
cannot maintain end-to-end message integrity and authentication for the media stream transmitted from 
an IP network to PSTN. 
3.2.2 SRTCP 
The format of SRTCP packet is similar to SRTP with two additional headers; SRTCP index and encrypt-
flag for authentication. In an RTCP message, the originating party and the contents of the report are 
sensitive information which needs to be protected. Therefore these headers are encrypted.  
3.3 Key Management Mechanisms 
Key management is an essential element of protecting Internet multimedia applications such as VoIP. 
Key negotiation protocol is required for the multimedia communications such as VoIP that can provide 
 robust and extensible capabilities for multicast as well as unicast communications. Currently, there are 
several existing and emerging key management standards. As MIKEY and ZRPT are currently gaining 
population in VoIP environments, this section focuses on these two key management protocols.  
3.3.1 MIKEY 
Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) is a key management protocol which was designed for real-time 
applications. MIKEY is defined in RFC 3830 (Arkko, Carrara, Lindholm, Naslund, & Norrman, 2004) 
and used to support SRTP. MIKEY endures the negotiation of cryptographic keys and security 
parameters for one or more security protocols. It also provides independency of a specific 
communication protocol such as SIP and H.323. The 2-way handshake fashion for initiating key 
material of MIKEY makes it suitable for real-time multimedia scenarios.  
3.3.2 ZRTP 
ZRTP (Ziemmermann, 2008) is another cryptographic key agreement protocol that can be used to 
support secured RTP. The negotiation of the cryptographic key using RTP instead of signaling route is 
the main difference between ZRTP and MIKEY, such that the key negotiation is performed between 
endpoints directly without engaging intermediate terminals such as SIP proxies to pass along the keying 
components.  
 ZRTP has an edge on MIKEY as it provides independency of signaling protocols therefore only 
the endpoint software is required for the change but not the core VoIP elements (e.g., SIP proxy or an 
H.323 gatekeeper).  However, one limitation that both protocols suffer is that they cannot support the 
calls that are transmitted between VoIP network and PSTN. 
4. VoIP Attacks and Solutions 
Attackers typically target the most popular and well-publicized systems and applications. VoIP has 
become one of such application. Several VoIP weaknesses have been revealed recently, thus protocol 
 designers need to address it before successfully deploying VoIP on the global scale. In this section, we 
present a study of attacks on the VoIP infrastructure. We classify the attacks into five primary types, 
including: Denial of service (DoS), Eavesdropping, Masquerading, Toll Fraud, and Spam over Internet 
Telephony (SPIT). Furthermore, we discuss approaches that have been adopted to counter the attacks.  
4.1 DoS 
DoS attacks pose perhaps the greatest threat to enterprise VoIP systems. DoS attack is ranked first in the 
top five VoIP security threats of 2008 (Higdon, 2008). DoS attacks can be directly toward any network 
element to disrupt the system’s functionality or the networking capabilities of the corresponding 
component such as user’s devices, signaling components, media components, management systems, 
billing systems, and security systems. 
4.1.1 DoS Attacks Reported 
There has been a report that certain VoIP phones are susceptible to both DoS attacks and communication 
interception vulnerabilities, and certain VoIP routers are also vulnerable to malicious traffic (Leyden, 
2004). In addition, an open-source IP PBX and an open-source VoIP client have been reported to have 
vulnerabilities that can allow hackers to compromise VoIP networks with DoS attacks (Network 
Computing, 2006). National Cyber-Alert System (2005) has reported that another type of VPN Routers 
allows remote attackers to cause a DoS (crash) via an IPSec IKE packet with a malformed Internet 
Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP). Another type of IP phones has also 
been reported that it is rendered unusable by bombarding them with specific IP traffic (Mier, Birdsall, & 
Thayer, 2004).   
4.1.2 Proposed Solutions for DoS Attacks 
Sisalem, Kuthan, & Ehlert (2006) recommended some countermeasures to handle DoS attacks in SIP 
VoIP systems including: 
  Monitoring and filtering – to maintain lists of suspicious users and deny those users from 
establishing sessions. 
 Authentication – to verify the identity of a user before forwarding his/her messages. 
 Stateless proxy – to reduce the risk of memory exhaustion attacks (DoS) thus stateless proxy can 
be used to perform other security checks such as authenticating users, registering third party, and 
filtering spam sources. 
 Server design (e.g. CPU, memory, and network connection) – to be the first line of defense 
against DoS attacks.  
Sengar, Wijesekera, & Jajodia (2008) also proposed a technique to detect DoS attacks by using 
statistical approach based on abnormal variations in traffic flows measured by Hellinger distance.  
4.2 Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping is the attempt to collect sensitive information to prepare for an attack or gain 
intelligence. In VoIP, this is a scenario where the attacker is able to monitor signaling or media contents 
exchanged between users in order to analyze communications to prepare for other future attacks.  
4.2.1 Eavesdropping Attacks Reported 
The Internet Security Systems’ X-Force team discovered VoIP security flaws in a vender’s call manager 
that would give an attacker the ability to eavesdrop or redirect calls, in addition to gaining unauthorized 
access to networks running the VoIP products (VoIP Magazine Editorial Staff, 2005). If attackers 
exploited the vulnerabilities, they could set off a heap overflow within the call manager, causing a DoS 
condition, and compromising the call manager.  
4.2.2 Proposed Solutions for Eavesdropping Attacks 
Long (2002) recommends four strategies to prevent eavesdropping: 
 Employing flawless hardware. 
  Ensuring that access to wiring closets is restricted to authorized personnel only. 
 Implementing port based MAC address security on any vulnerable network point; for example, 
on a reception courtesy phone. 
 Initiating a procedure to regularly scan the network for devices running in promiscuous mode. 
Another solution is encryption of VoIP traffic, which is a good method for preventing 
eavesdropping, however it adds additional overhead. 
4.3 Masquerading 
Masquerading is the ability to impersonate a user, device, or service to gain access to a network, service, 
network element, or information. Masquerading attacks can be used to commit fraud, unauthorized 
access to sensitive information, and even service disruption. Perhaps the worst case is that the attackers 
pretends or takes over someone’s identity in the service. Manipulating protocols that provide support for 
VoIP can also be realized as a masquerading attack in VoIP networks. 
4.3.1 Masquerading Attacks Reported 
There has been a report that a bank and on-line payment service were victims of attacks where the 
attacker called a credit-card customer and duped the customer into revealing account information by 
claiming there had been fraudulent activity on their accounts (Higgins, 2006). 
4.3.2 Proposed Solutions for Masquerading Attacks 
An effective authentication module combined with encryption would be an effective solution to 
masquerading and spoofing attacks. 
4.4 Toll Fraud 
Toll fraud is the ability to have unauthorized access to the VoIP services for personal or monetary gain. 
For telecommunication carriers and providers, this is one of the most critical attacks. Toll fraud can be 
 realized by manipulating the signaling messages or the configuration of VoIP components, including the 
billing systems.  
4.4.1 Toll Fraud Attacks Reported 
The financial implications of toll fraud are more profound than perceived by telephone subscribers. The 
Communications Fraud Control Association (CFCA) conducted world-wide survey (Communications 
Fraud Control Association, 2006) and estimated that telecommunication fraud losses range from 
US$54.4 to 60 billion (52% increase from 2003’s CFCA Survey results). Fraud has been reported as the 
largest area of revenue leakage for telecommunication operators. According to the Telecomasia.net 
survey (Chau, 2007), the overall levels of revenue leakage among global telecommunication operators 
were increased from 12.1% in 2006 to 13.6% in 2007. In recent scam (Blackwell, 2006), a Spokane 
resident hacked into an unprotected corporate IP network and into the networks of several VoIP 
providers. Attacker routed traffic from the company’s customer through the corporate network to the 
VoIP providers. The providers were left with the interconnect charges (as much as $300,000 per victim). 
A Miami service provider was reported to have hacked into other provider networks, routing his 
customers’ calls onto their networks, and then billing his customers (Teal, 2006). 
4.4.2 Proposed Solutions for Toll Fraud Attacks 
VoIP providers can prevent toll fraud by properly configuring firewalls and by protecting ports. VoIP 
providers must also actively monitor their networks, so that they know who is accessing the network and 
with what frequency, and who is generating what kind of traffic. 
4.5 SPIT 
Due to its much lower communication costs, VoIP network has become more attractive as an alternative 
to the current PSTN as well as a target for spammers. VoIP spam or also known as Spam over Internet 
 Telephony (SPIT) is expected to be a serious problem for VoIP networks and even more severe than e-
mail spam problem because of its attacking nature for which requires a real-time defense mechanism. 
4.5.1 SPIT Reported 
SPIT problem does not really exist in the current VoIP networks just yet. However, as VoIP community 
becomes larger, SPIT is expected to be one of the greatest threats. For current VoIP systems, SPIT are in 
forms of phishing (or also known as “Vishing” in VoIP networks) as can be seen in the following 
reports. Gonsalves (2006) reports an attack where a con artist sent VoIP spam disguised as if coming 
from a small bank and collected personal identification numbers. Ryst (2006) reports that an attacker 
sent e-mails that appeared to come from the account-validation team at an online-payment service. 
Unlike most phishing schemes that direct the recipient to a fraudulent web site, this scam instructed 
victims to call a phone number, where they are asked to divulge account information. A security vendor 
reports a worm that spreads through the chat feature of a popular VoIP service (Kirk, 2006). Users 
receive a message asking them to download a file call “sp.exe.” The executable is a Trojan horse that 
can steal passwords. If a user runs the Trojan, it triggers another set of code to spread itself. 
4.5.2 Proposed Solutions for SPIT 
Despite inexistence of the problem, there has been an increasingly number of solutions proposed to 
combat the SPIT due to its potential threat. The overview of the SPIT problem are well provided by 
Rosenberg & Jenings (2007), Radermacher (2005), Niccolini (2006), and Baumann, Cavin, & Schmid 
(2006), who analyzed the problem and discussed various possible solutions to detect and mitigate VoIP 
spam.  
Jenings (2007) suggested using cryptographic puzzles to detain spammers (especially DoS 
attackers) by increasing the cost of the request of the communication by requiring a suspicious caller 
who attempts to establish a connection to solve a small puzzle which is computational expensive. The 
 drawback of this solution is that the puzzle challenges may overwhelm a legitimate caller’s slow 
machine which may cause undesirable delay.  
Payment at risk (Abani, Burrows, Birrell, Dabek, & Wobber, 2003) is another idea to increase 
the cost of the communication by having a caller deposits some amount of money into callee’s account 
in order to establish a call. This may reduce spam dramatically but it might as well reduce legitimate 
callers since the main advantage of VoIP network over the PSTN is cost.  
Black and white lists have also been studied and utilized to reduce SPIT (e.g. Dantu & Kolan, 
2005; Rohwer & Tolkmit, 2006; Schwartz & Sterman, 2005; and Sterman, 2005) where spam filter 
maintains two lists of addresses, white list for wanted callers and black list for unwanted callers or 
spammer. However, this approach may disable a legitimate caller who is not on the white list to make a 
call. In case that the black list is used alone, then spammer can easily reach the recipient by changing IP 
address.  
Greylisting (e.g. Radermacher, 2005; and Shin & Shim, 2005) is also an effective technique to 
filter SPIT, however it only works well in the case that spammer does not change IP address and 
attempts to reestablish a call within a certain time period with a certain rate of calling. The cost of false 
negative can be too high caused by emergency calls from legitimate callers.  
Reputation systems have also been applied to combat SPIT (e.g. Dantu et al., 2005; Hansen, 
Hansen, & Moller, 2006; and Balasubramaniyan, Ahamed, & Park, 2007). Dantu et al. (2005) proposed 
a multi-stage VoIP spam filter using reputation inference based on social networks (associated and 
trusted neighbors) from which the user was willing to receive calls. This approach needs high 
collaborative effort from several different domains and its high complexity of the filter may cause 
undesired delay in initiating connection.  Hansen et al. (2006) utilized a reputation system by rating a 
call based on meta-data of the call such as caller identity and call origin. Balasubramaniyan et al. (2007) 
 also applied reputation mechanism by assigning credential value for each user to determine social 
network linkages to distinguish between legitimate users and spammers. However, these reputation 
approaches require high collaboration from proxy servers to maintain as well as exchange reputation or 
trustworthiness values between users.  
There are also SPIT detection techniques proposed based on anomalous characteristics of the 
spam call (e.g. Shin et al., 2005; Vinokurov & MacIntosh, 2005; and Sengar, Wang, Wijesekera, & 
Jajodia, 2007). Vinokurov et al. (2005) proposed a technique to detect SPIT based on recognizing 
abnormalities in signaling message statistics. Shin et al. (2005) used graylisting technique to recognize 
abnormality of the call based on calling rate. Sengar et al. (2007) proposed the use of Hellinger distance 
to detect abnormalities of the call behavior to identify spam call. The drawback of the abnormality 
detection approach is that it requires learning period and its false negative rate is critical. 
5. Conclusion 
VoIP has become a key enabling technology for multimedia communication on the IP network. In 
addition, the Internet being an open network virtually eliminates geographic limitations for placing 
phone calls. However, as VoIP uses the existing IP network and thus inherits its vulnerabilities. To study 
the security issues related to VoIP, one must understand the basic VoIP architecture and existing defense 
mechanisms as well as current and potential threats and attacks on VoIP networks. In this article, we 
describe the basic VoIP architecture which consists of end-user equipment, network components, and 
VoIP gateway, as well as the fundamental differences compared to PSTN. The protocols used in VoIP 
systems for signaling such as H.323 and SIP, and for media transport such as RTP and RTCP have been 
described. We further discuss the existing defense mechanisms that are deployed in current VoIP 
systems to protect signaling (S/MIME, IPSec, and H.235), media transport (SRTP and SRTCP), and 
handle key management (MIKEY and ZRTP). Finally, the current VoIP attacks (e.g. DoS, 
 Eavesdropping, Masquerading, and Toll fraud) and their possible solutions are discussed followed by a 
discussion of the potential VoIP attacks such as SPIT and a survey of proposed solutions.  
 To secure the VoIP networks, we must have the basic knowledge of VoIP systems and its 
available security tools. Thus, we hope that this article provides such knowledge and useful information 
for readers who have interests in VoIP deployment and security.   
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